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Minor Rights and Wrongs

Michelle Oberman

years. Frequently, teenagers are serious and adult-like,
nconsistency
may they
well be
hallmark
of the teenage
arethe
callow
and unpredictable.
yet
just as often,
Generally, they are all of these things, in no particular ordur. They studiously observe the adults in their lives, adopting certain values and behaviors, while wholly rejecting
others. Their moods shift without warning, leaving entire
households with the sensation that they are living on a
roller-coaster. As a result, it is not entirely surprising that
the legal system has had difficulty deciding how to respond
to them. The laws devised to govern teenagers are layered,
reflecting society's alternating perceptions of teenagers as
adult-like and child-like, and our accompanying impulses
to respect as well as to protect this population. Read together, these laws defy any consistent description of adolescent capacity. We have lived with these inconsistencies
for so long, though, that they have grown rather familiar
to us, and that we hardly recognize the puzzle in the fact
that we trust eighteen year olds enough to let them fight
and die in the military, but not enough to let them drink
alcoholic beverages.
These inconsistencies extend into health care, where
the laws governing adolescent capacity form a patchwork
quilt of rights and limitations. A teenage mother must give
consent before her baby may be treated, but, by and large,
is not permitted to consent to her own health care. An
adolescent boy can be tested and treated for HIV without
parental involvement, but his parents must consent to setting his broken leg.
The laws governing minors in the health care setting
do not reflect a comprehensive theory of adolescent capacity, rather, they have evolved more or less in accordance
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with societal perceptions of adolescents' health care needs.
In large part, modifications to the traditional rule that adolescents must obtain parental consent prior to treatment
have been accomplished by way of the mature minor doctrine. Many health care providers and social liberals view
this doctrine as the progressive solution to an archaic rule.
Ironically, when one observes the mature minor doctrine in practice, it becomes apparent that, despite the fact
that the exception is premised on adolescent maturity, no
consensus exists, nor even a coherent description to guide
those who assess maturity. Instead, the laws governing
minors reflect society's evolving intuitive sense of the extent to which adolescents require protection. Maturity operates as a code word, invoked to permit minors access to
treatments that society deems desirable, and to limit their
access to treatments that carry the possibility of long-term
negative consequences. The present system works not because minors are mature, but because of the tacit utilitarian calculus that governs minors' access to care.
Until recently, the nascent state of scientific inquiry
and knowledge about adolescence yielded little alternative
to this euphemistic invocation of maturity. However, the
last several decades have brought forth two developments
that magnify the problems inherent in the current formulation of the maturity standard, and render reconsideration of the mature minor doctrine both necessary and inevitable. First, the study of adolescence has blossomed, and
we now have access to a considerable amount of information about the nature nd the limitations of adolescent
maturity. At the same time, adolescents and their advocates have petitioned courts, seeking to invoke ever expanding legal rights under the mature minor doctrine.
Because of this confluence of events, the law is at a
critical juncture. For the first time, those asked to evaluate
minors' requests for treatment may do so by reference to
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their abilities and needs. At the same time, the nature of
the treatments requested by minors are increasingly controversial in nature, and health providers have no easy utilitarian calculus by which to determine the permissibility of
access.
This article takes a critical position on the hasty, unexamined expansion of the mature minor doctrine, and ultimately calls for a systematic reevaluation of the justifications underlying adolescents' access to care. The emerging
right-to-die cases involving "mature minors" provide ample
evidence of the problems in the law as presently configured, and of the importance and timeliness of this reevaluation. These cases therefore provide the point of departure
for this inquiry. The following section struggles to make
sense of modern law by exploring the evolution of the law
governing minors' capacity in the health care setting. Finally, having illustrated the law's failure to address the abilities and vulnerabilities of the adolescent patient, and the
dangers inherent in an uninformed expansion of the mature minor doctrine, I return to the problem of regulating
access to care for minors. The final section explores three
alternative models for responding to the challenges posed
by adolescents in the health care setting. Ultimately, I suggest that the difficult new cases, on which no societal consensus exists, be resolved on a case-by-case basis that is
similar to the present approach, with one critical exception: the notion of maturity and capacity for decision making must be informed by contemporary research on adolescents.
Mature minors and the right to die
In 1989, the Illinois Supreme Court became the first court
in the United States to rule that a minor patient should be
permitted to refuse medical treatment necessary to save
her life.' In re E.G. involved a seventeen-and-one-half-yearold leukemia patient whose doctors recommended a course
of treatment that included a series of blood transfusions.
She objected to these on the basis of her religious convictions, and the court upheld her right to refuse the transfusions, reasoning that:
Although the age of majority in Illinois is eighteen,
that age is not an impenetrable barrier that magically
precludes a minor from possessing and exercising certain rights normally associated with adulthood.... If
the evidence is clear and convincing that the minor is
mature enough to appreciate the consequences of her
actions ... then the mature minor doctrine affords
her the common law right to consent to or refuse
medical treatment. 2
The court was cautious in articulating the minor's right to
refuse treatment, and it limited its decision to these facts: a

seventeen-and-one-half-year-old patient, with an emotional
maturity far beyond her years, who refuses treatment on
the basis of deeply held, family-shared religious convictions.' At a surface level, it is hard to disagree with this
outcome. E.G. was a mere six months shy of her eighteenth birthday, and her psychologist testified that she had
the maturity of a twenty-two year old. Moreover, because
of the slow pace of the Illinois judicial process, E.G. was
transfused in order to preserve her life pending the outcome of her case. Thus, as her own attorney confessed to
me, with a touch of irony, "her victory gave us the best of
both worlds ...she's now a healthy twenty year old, whose
right to die was vindicated.""
At a more profound level, however, the decision isproblematic. In effect, it marked the first time a court indicated
that minors should be permitted to make the most controversial of health care decisions-those with fatal consequences. Although E.G. enjoys the unique satisfaction of
obtaining legal recognition of her right to die, even as she
survives into adulthood, this only occurred because of the
slow moving judicial process. The impact of the decision
necessarily was to raise the possibility of a less felicitous
outcome for other minors.
In the years following the E.G. decision, at least four
other courts have visited the issue of a minor's right to
refuse treatment.' Together, these cases demonstrate that
the problems posed by such requests are complex and that
their resolution requires a more explicitly articulated analysis than that provided by E.G. Each of these subsequent
decisions involves minors who either were less mature or
were younger than E.G. was when her case came to court.
Thus, they fail to meet the Illinois court's standard of a
"seventeen-and-one-half-year-old" patient who is mature
beyond her years. Nevertheless, the courts do not simply
revert to a bright-line age-based standard. Instead, they
assume that some minors have a right to refuse treatment,
and that the courts' task is to determine whether the minor
before them is one of these. Ultimately, this determination
rests on subjective judicial assessments of the patients'
maturity. Unfortunately, these cases reveal that the courts
are remarkably ill equipped to make such determinations.
In the Matter of Long IslandJewish Medical CenteA
illustrates this point. The case involved Phillip Malcolm, a
cancer patient who was only seven weeks shy of his eighteenth birthday at the time of his refusal of treatment. Both
Phillip and his parents refused to consent to the recommended course of blood transfusions on religious grounds.
At first glance, the facts of this case, especially the minor's
proximity to the age of majority and his family's support
for his refusal of treatment, lend strong support to the
minor's request. However, the judge noted that the family
had "joined the Jehovah's Witnesses in 1987," only three
years prior to this decision, and that, although Phillip "did
appear to understand the basic tenet of the religion's pro-
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hibition regarding blood transfusions," he was not sufficiently mature to make this decision on his own.7 In rejecting Phillip's request, the judge noted that:
He has never been away from home and has never
dated a girl. He consults his parents before making
decisions and when asked whether he considered himself an adult or a child, he responded "child." There
was no evidence that Phillip had been urged by his
parents to make his own decision regarding blood
transfusion.9
The Long Island decision demonstrates the inherent
flexibility of the maturity standard in practice. When faced
with evidence indicating that the minor's decision merely
reflects parents' wishes, the court deemed this nearly eighteen-year-old minor immature, and refused to honor his
treatment preference. At the same time, the subjectivity
inherent in this approach signals an ominous potential for
inconsistent, even arbitrary and prejudicial, decision making. After all, this judge's determination was based in part
on a belief that maturity is demonstrated by a minor's having gone on dates with members of the opposite sex!
The dangers inherent in the present formulation of the
"mature minor" doctrine arise precisely from its subjective, inarticulated nature. As presently configured, the doctrine involves a maturity assessment that is only as sophisticated as the decision makers choose to make it. Maturity
is not a discrete, easily measured vital statistic. Instead, it
is a relative concept, influenced by many factors, including
the circumstances that have led the minor to articulate a
treatment preference. Thus, when a decision maker is faced
with a minor's refusal of life-sustaining treatment, it is
imperative to recognize that critical illness in any family
member causes considerable tension and crisis for the entire family unit. If we acknowledge that adult's treatment
preferences may be driven by factors such as guilt, financial worries, emotional manipulations, and other forms of
family strife," then why believe that minors are immune
from these factors. Instead, the) serve to render the already complex task of ascertaining the minor's maturity
all the more difficult. Tvo cases illustrate this problem.
To date, the most dramatic case involving an adolcscent's refusal of treatment is that of Benny Agrelo, a
fifteen year old who received a liver transplant during the
summer of 1993.1" As is the case with all transplant recipients, Benny was prescribed heavy doses of anti-rejection
medication. He found the side-effects of these medicines
(nausea, migraines, stomach cramps, swollen joints, and
edginess) too debilitating and painful to tolerate. He stopped
taking the medicine in that fall. His mother and an older
brother were aware that he was no longer taking his medications, and they believed, as did Benny, that he seemed
better without the medicine than with it. It is unclear when

his physicians learned of Benny's noncompliance, but no
action was taken against him until June 1994, when state
officials forced him to undergo treatment at a local hospital. A legal battle ensued, and a trial judge ruled that the
state could not force the boy to take his medication. Benny
died in August 1994.
Because the record is sealed, the basis of the judge's
ruling must be inferred from context. It is reasonable to
assume, however, that the judge applied the mature minor
doctrine in reaching his decision. In a sense, it is hard to
criticize the judge for his ruling. Benny was adamant that
the pain of living with the medications was unbearable and
that he felt far better without them. His family supported
his decision and applauded his courage. Moreover, by the
time the case came before the judge, the boy's condition
was so weakened that it is doubtful that medications, or
even a liver transplant, would have been viable life-saving
options.
Several months after Benny Agrelo's death, sixteenyear-old Billy Best ran away from his home in Massachusetts to avoid undergoing chemotherapy for his Hodgkin's
lymphoma. Like Agrelo, Billy claimed that the medicine
was killing him, rather than curing him, and that he felt
better without it. Best spent a month in Texas, where he
lived with some friends he had met while skateboarding.
He then returned home, explaining that his doctors had
promised to modify his treatments, and that "his parents
wanted him to, and he didn't want to get into an argument
over it.""
For those who advocate extending rights to mature
minors, the implications of these cases are troubling. Billy
Best's family and physicians allowed him the right to refuse
medical treatment in exchange for his return home. Although their concession was understandable, it is a bizarre
standard that allocates adult rights to adolescents whose
demand for autonomy takes the form of a grandiose temper-tantrum, as opposcd to a reasoned demand for control.
Likewise, it is noteworthy that Benny Agrelo stopped
taking his medication ten months prior to the state's intervention. Even if one believes that, at age fourteen, Benny
might have been sufficiently informed and mature to exercise a right to die, no one made such a determination in his
case until his health had deteriorated so as to make the
determination virtually moot. Moreover, it seems possible
that Benny viewed his illness as burdensome and costly for
his mother and siblings, as well as for himself, and that his
refusal of treatment was based in part on a sense of obligation to them.
The stakes are extraordinarily high in these cases, and
the time is surely ripe for a critical assessment to determine how much judicial deference is owed to minors who
claim to be sufficiently mature to exercise adult rights. To
undertake that assessment, we must understand the evolu-
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tion of adolescent rights over the course of the twentieth
century.

A brief history of adolescent rights
Perhaps the most surprising fact about adolescence is that
it is a relatively novel concept. It was not until 1904 that
sociologist G. Stanley Hall gave the name adolescence to
the second decade of life. 2 His description of the Sturm
und Drang (storm and stress) which characterized this phase
of human development triggered considerable debate
among social scientists." In fact, Margaret Mead's well
known early work in Samoa grew out of her determination to prove that "adolescence" was a cultural creation,
rather than a biological phenomena. 4
Law and policy makers of the early twentieth century
left the debate to the academics, and focused on crafting
laws to accommodate this population. For example, this
era witnessed the passage of laws mandating public schooling and regulating child labor." The juvenile justice system
was developed in order to avoid housing minor criminals
with adult criminals. Its goal was to shelter and redirect
the behavior of wayward minors.' All of these changes
were driven by a moral conviction that adolescents, despite their adult-like appearances, were somehow different
and in need of adult guidance and legal protection.
During the ensuing decades, the impulse to protect
minors has remained in tact. For example, to this day, contract law protects minors from commercial exploitation
by permitting them to void their contracts. In essence, this
means that any contract formed with a minor will be valid
and binding only insofar as, and for as long as, the minor
agrees to be bound by it. Newer laws prohibit "minors"
from purchasing or consuming alcoholic beverages, even
after they have attained the age of majority.
More recently, however, a distinct set of laws has developed alongside these protective laws, and this set seems
to indicate an expanded notion of adolescent competence
and capacity. These laws include the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which lowered the voting age from twenty-one to
eighteen, the criminal justice system's increasing willingness to charge juvenile offenders as adults, and the various
provisions permitting minors to obtain certain forms of
medical treatment without parental consent. At first glance,
these recent changes may suggest that the legal system is
moving toward recognizing adolescents as fully competent
adults. This seems particularly true of the medical treatment laws, which are referred to as "mature minor" provisions. It is thus surprising to find that the purposes underlying laws that treat minors like adults have almost nothing to do with the perceived maturity of the adolescent
population. A critical evaluation of the mature minor doctrine reveals that these laws, like those before them, grow
out of the traditional impulse to protect this population.

Historically, minors have been precluded from consenting to their own medical treatment until they reach the
age of majority.17 Any health care provider who treated a
minor absent parental consent was therefore at risk of a
lawsuit by the parents for assault and battery. The policy
underlying this rule is reflected Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Parbam v. J.R.: "
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western
Civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad
parental authority over minor children.... The law's
concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience and judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has
recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. 19
From the earliest mention of this rule, an exception
has been made for emergencies, in the event of which a
child of any age may be treated absent consent. 2 It is important to note that this exception was not premised on a
minor's greater ability to comprehend and, thus, consent
to such care. Rather, the guardian's consent to emergency
care was implied, on the theory that any delay incurred in
attempting to secure consent would jeopardize the minor's
health. 2' A second traditional exception to this rule permitted emancipated minors to consent to their own care.
The definition of emancipationvaries from state to state,
but it is generally limited to minors who are not living at
home, who are not economically dependent on their parents, and whose parents have surrendered parental duties.2"
In the past, this category consisted primarily of married
minors and minors in the military service?23
During the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated
a right to privacy that barred states from illegalizing contraception. Because the decisions only addressed the rights
of consenting adults, teenagers were excluded from their
reach. During this decade, growing evidence suggested that
sexual activity among teenagers was relatively commonplace, and that, because they could not consent to care on
their own, teenagers' health status was in jeopardy. Specifically, it became increasingly evident that an epidemic of
sexually transmitted diseases was spreading among unemancipated teenagers. This public health concern, coupled with
a fear that teens would not seek treatment for these communicable conditions if their parents had to be notified
of-let alone give consent for--such treatment, led states
to pass "minor treatment statutes." 4 Today, every state has
a statute that permits unemancipated minors, ranging in
age from fourteen to seventeen, to consent to care for sexually transmitted diseases.2? Along the same lines, many states
also permit minors to consent to alcohol- and substanceabuse treatment,2 and to psychiatric care.2'
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Minor treatment statutes reflect a public consensus that
ensuring minors' access to the given treatment outweighs
parental interests in controlling the care a child receives.
The focus of such exceptions rests not on an assessment of
maturity, but on a calculus that grants minors autonomy
only when the treatment is relatively low risk, and when
denying access may cause the minor (or the public at large)
to suffer permanent harm.
Even as state legislatures passed minor treatment statutes, a more contentious debate was brewing among law
makers and physicians over the issue of minors' access to
contraceptives and reproductive health care, generally. In
1977, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved this debate by invoking the common law mature minor doctrine to permit
health care providers to dispense contraceptives to minors
without parental consent. The mature minor doctrine grew
out of a series of cases in which physicians treated minors
without parental consent, and were subsequently sued for
battery. The physicians defended themselves by arguing that
the minors were sufficiently mature to consent to their own
care. 2" These defenses were by and large successful, provided that the treatment given was beneficial and low risk.-"'
In applying the mature minor doctrine to reproductive health care, the Supreme Court relied on the same
underlying justifications present in the earlier decisions.
The Court reasoned that sexually active minors need protection from unwanted pregnancy, and that, to the extent
that the law mandates parental consent, minors who fear
parental disapproval will risk pregnancy rather than obtain contraceptives. The determination to expand minors'
rights does not reflect a sense that minors are mature; rather,
it reflects a belief that unwanted teenage pregnancy was
both a predictable and an undesirable consequence of the
common law rule.-" Thus, the decision makes no mention
of the definition or level of maturity that the minor must
possess in order to avail herself of this provision. As a result, the law has been interpreted as meaning that any minor who seeks contraceptives is, by definition, sufficiently
mature to consent.
The lack of definition of maturity returns to haunt the
court in the abortion cases, where the consensus regarding
the benefits of the treatment falters. Among the very first
challenges brought before the Supreme Court in the wake
of its decision to legalize abortion were cases involving
state laws that restricted minors' ability to consent to the
procedure without parental involvement. Between 1976
and 1990, the Supreme Court issued six opinions regard2
ing parental involvement in minors' abortion decisions.
Ultimately, the Court resolved the issue by permitting states
to require minors who seek abortions to obtain either the
consent of their parents or the approval of a judge. The
latter entails a judicial bypass hearing, in which the minor
must demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make
her own decision regarding abortion.

Despite explicit reference to maturity, the definition
of maturity that emerges from these cases remains elusive.
The cases indicate that a minor is entitled to a court-order
permitting an abortion if she understands her situation,
understands the abortion procedure and its risks, and articulates a desire to have an abortion." In the event that a
judge finds the minor immature, the law requires that the
judge must grant consent for the abortion if it is "found to
be in the minor's best interests.""
The abortion decisions never explain how a minor is
to demonstrate her maturity, nor do they guide the judge
in making this assessment. Because the abortion cases offer no substantive analysis of adolescent maturity, it is
unsurprising that the practical consequence of the abortion rulings is that virtually all minors who seek judicial
permission to obtain an abortion without parental involvement are deemed sufficiently mature to consent. 5
The cumbersome route to permitting adolescents to
consent to abortion reflects the politically divisive nature
of the abortion debate, and the fact that, unlike contraception, there is less public consensus about whether it is in a
minor's best interest to procure an abortion. This debate is
not about adolescent capacity-it is about parental rights
to control their children. As one court noted in an early
decision on the matter, the parental notification abortion
cases are ultimately cast "not in terms of protecting [mi'
nors], but in recognizing independent rights of parents." 6
This analysis suggests that the cases that purport to
turn on the maturity of minors actually rest on factors that
have little to do with maturity, but far more to do with
politics. The mature minor decisions reflect the dual goals
of protecting society and promoting minors' best interests,
and when no consensus exists on whether permitting access to a given treatment furthers either of these two goals,
minors will be denied access.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the law regulating access to government funding for sterilization. In contrast to the laws guaranteeing minors' access to contraceptives without parental involvement, and permitting states
to fund that contraception, when the same minors seek
access to a permanent form of contraception--sterilization-federal law precludes the funding of such procedures
until age twenty-one.'-7 These regulations have withstood
constitutional challenges brought by young mothers, who
argue that, by age eighteen, they have reached the age of
majority; and the law deems them sufficiently mature to
consent not only to all other forms of contraception, but
- The refusal to
also to all other medical care generally.IX
permit these women to exercise their autonomy in choosing sterilization reflects more than societal ambivalence
about sterility. It also indicates a consensus that the decision to be sterilized is one that should only be made by
those whose capacity is unquestionable, and implicitly reveals our sense that even those who have reached age eigh-
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teen may not possess sufficient maturity to make an irreversible medical decision.
Toward a working definition of maturity
For more than twenty years, we have witnessed the development of laws and policies predicated on minors' maturity, and yet we have scarcely begun to consider what we
mean by this standard. To some extent, this lack of discussion may result from the controversial nature of the medical treatments at issue in most of these cases. Our society's
general unwillingness to engage in open discussions regarding sexuality may account for our reluctance to articulate
the tactors that we consider preconditions to an individual's
readiness to explore and enjoy his/her sexuality. Furthermore, those who favor teenagers' access to reproductive
health care may be reluctant to focus directly on the meaning of maturity for quite another reason. If access to contraceptives is predicated solely on maturity, we may not
really want to know whether a sexually active twelve-yearold girl is sufficiently mature to consent to receiving a prescription for the birth control pill.
The inevitable result is that, when confronted with
minors who request medical treatment that is contrary to
whzr we consider to be in their best interests, we find ourselves -at an impasse. We generally resolve this by determining that they are simply too immature to make this
m.:dical decision on their own. This is most certainly disingenuous, of course, because the same minors might easily have been found mature had they sought a more acceptable course of treatment-one that parents, doctors,
and lawyers could deem to be in their "best interest."'"
This point is illustrated by exploring the following
hypothetical case. Recall fifteen-year-old Benny Agrelo, who
received a kidney transplant, but decided to discontinue
his anti-rejection medication because the side-effects were
too debilitating. Now imagine that his family, including
his mother and his adult brother, did not support his decision, but instead brought him to his doctors and insisted
that he be treated. It seems extraordinarily unlikely that, in
the face of a guardian's request to render life-saving treatment to a minor, the health care providers would insist
that the minor was sufficiently mature to refuse treatment
and die. If the treatment team was highly sensitive to ethical and legal conflicts, the matter might have found its
way to an ethics committee, or perhaps into court. Most
likely, though, the treatment would have been rendered
without further ado.
At least two plausible explanations account for this
outcome. First, we may reason that a fifteen-year-old who
wants to refuse treatment and die, even though his parents
and doctors believe that he will survive if treated, is by
definition, immature. Perhaps we assume that, because the
adults in his life would consent to treatment, his refusal

reflects his adolescent inability to endure short-term pain
in order to reap long-term benefits. Some research indicates that younger adolescents are motivated by short-term
hedonic needs, and that until they develop a higher cognitive maturity level, they will be disinclined to comply with
an uncomfortable course of treatment. 4'
On the other hand, why assume that this is true of all
fifteen year olds who refuse treatment? Moreover, even an
adolescent whose parents support his/her refusal of treatment may be motivated by hedonic, short-term goals. The
problem with any of these explanations is that they assume a direct and skillful evaluation of the adolescent's
maturity. Yet, as we know from the earlier analysis, to date,
medical and legal decision makers have been hesitant to
define the factors that comprise legal maturity.
More likely, then, the fact that we are more inclined to
permit an adolescent to refuse treatment when his parents
support him/her than when they do not reflects our longstanding "concept[] of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.... [in which] natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests
of their children." 41 The irony here is that the legal system
defers to parents only insofar as parents are believed to be
acting in their children's best interests. In the medical setting, and elsewhere, the law intervenes to limit parental
discretion when their choices threaten their children's wellbeing.42 Health care providers routinely seek and obtain
court-ordered medical treatment for minors over parental
objections. 43 Therefore, it seems that when the law permits
an adolescent to refuse medical treatment because he/she
has parental support, we express our tacit agreement that
treatment is not in the child's best interests. Yet, if we consider whether it was truly in Benny Agrelo's best interests
to refuse treatment, the answer is far from self-evident.
As the foregoing analysis indicates, the unexamined
manner in which we use maturity in evaluating adolescent
assertions of autonomy in the health care setting results in
random outcomes that only serve to disguise that we have
little sense of the appropriate way to respond to this population. In an effort to move beyond the arbitrariness of the
present approach, I now explore three alternative models
for resolving the problems inherent in treatment of adolescent minors.
Lowering the age of medical competence
Perhaps the simplest way to resolve the problems posed by
adolescents is to adopt a strict chronological standard, identifying an age at which minors will automatically be deemed
competent to consent to (or refuse) all medical care. For
example, research indicates that between ages twelve and
fourteen, adolescents undergo a major shift in cognitive
functioning that enables them to reason abstractly, as well
as to consider cause and effect relationships. 4 4 Thus, there
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isreason to advocate a standard treating fourteen year olds
as fully co-npetent in health care decision making. This
proposal has significant advantages beyond its simplicity.
It does not require the health cai-: provider (or the legal
system) to engage in a difficult and often elusive search for
maturity. As a result, it ensures consistent outcomes via a
process that is most certainly more efficient and less costly
than the present approach. Furthermore, depending on what
age we select, this standard could maintain most minors'
access to reproductive health care, as well as to any other
medical treatments this population requires.
Unfortunately, an age-based standard creates equally
weighty problems. To begin with, it is no less arbitrary
than the present approach, because it ignores the fact th.it
teens have widely varying levels of competency that depend not only on their biological stage of development,
but also on their life experience. The same research that
establishes tle adolescent onset of cognitive functioning
also indicates that these abilities are acquired gradually,
and that they reflect both a biological and an environmental component. Thus, it is over the course of years that an
adolescent will acquire an adult :apacity to "ponder ethical dilemmas about Itheiniseives, ... to weigh choices and
to experience the anguish or satisfaction efchoice." 3 Moreover, it is inevitable that some minors who are younger
than the minimum age will seek co consent to their own
health care treatment without parental involvement. This
standard leaves unresolved the problems posed by a sexually active eleven-year-old girl. If we eliminate a maturity
analysis, we must articulate some other standard that permits this population access to necessary health care. Otherwise, by denying them access to substance abuse treatment, contraceptives, and the like, the law may exacerbate
the health status of the very population it seeks to protect.
Adopting a uniform best interests approach
A second alternative is to reassert the common law prinLiple denying adolescents autonomy until they reach the
age of majority." Rather than attempting to discern an
adolescent's competence to consent to certain forms of treatment, parents or guardians would be granted presumptive
authority over their child's health care. Under this standard, providers would be required to obtain parental consent before treating a minor. If consent is denied and the
r rovider believes that the treatment is in the minor's best
interests, the provider must request a court-order to provide treatment.
Such a rule would be as efficient as any other agebased standard, in that it wolid not require competency
determinations. It has the further advantage of acknowledging the interdependent nature of individuals within families, and the way in which medical decisions may affect
not only the adolescent patient, but also the entire family

unit.4 7 The basic premise of this proposal is that most adolescents need assistance in making important medical decisions, and such assistance should come from people who
care deeply for the adolescent, rather than from strangers.

4

Despite the potential benefits reaped by this model,
significant dilemmas are inherent in this approach. The
first is that adolescents may not want their parents involved
in certain health care decisions, and, as a result, they will
avoid seeking treatment if parenal consent is required. It
is precisely this fear that gave rise to the "mature minor"
exception, and thus, a return to a strict age of majority
'-tandard must contend with the consequences of limiting
minors' access. This dilemma could be resolved, in the name
of the patient's best interests, by permitting minors access
to low-risk preventive and reproductive health care. In practice, this approach would yield approximately the same
results we achieve under the law as it now stands, in a
manner that is far less disingenuous.
Although there are benefits to recommend it, the best
interests test poses profcund problems. Many families are
not sufficiently in tact and supportive to be trusted to make
decisions that are truly in their child's best interests. Moreover, even functional families may be strained by a child's
illness, and thus factors such as dissension between spouses
and family financial strains may contribute to treatment
decisions. The blunt instrument of the law is ill suited for
ascertaining the extent to which a retusal of treatment derives from a parent's (or a child's) emotional exhaustion,
or even from their preoccupation with the impact on the
family of the high costs of treatment. Although one commentator has suggested that one could justify a policy honoring all parental deci;ons, including a parent's financially
motivated refusal to consent to a child's treatment, this
position lacks legal and ethical support.4
Finally, even if we determined that the law should permit parents the latitude to impose treatment on resistant
teenagers, the image of strapping a resistant sixteen year
old to a gurney in order to force treatment is difficult to
support. Whatever our legal standards may be, it is certainly a violation of ethical norms of autonomy to eclipse
wholly the minor from the decision-making process.' "
Seeking and finding maturity
Ironically, the flaw with any bright-line standard is its imprecision. In health care, the stakes are so high that the
efficiency-related benefits of chronological markers are far
outweighed by their arbitrary and potentially cruel results.
As a result of the shortcomings inherent in any bright-line
standard, it seems logical to pursue a direct inquiry into
maturity. The law has already given credence to the intrinsic value of maturity as a factor that should compel respect
for autonomy in an adolescent patient. Yet, as presently
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tasks must be accomplished in order to complete this transition: development of a sense of identity, adjustment to a
changing body, development of abstract thought and an
independent value system, development of interpersonal
skills and a new relationship with one's family, and the

health care system's response to adolescents should reflect
our awareness of this disjuncture. In a sense, the law already manifests this by recognizing adolescents' need for
access to certain forms of medical treatment based on biological maturity, in spite of our uncertainty about whether
an adolescent at any given age in fact understands the implications of a particular health care decision. As noted
earlier, we justify providing this population access to preventive care or low-risk treatments on the basis of a utilitarian calculus.
This approach may be sufficient when the patient is a
healthy adolescent and the low-risk treatment is in his/her
best interests. However, it is crucial to recognize that we
are motivated here strictly by our agreement on the patient's
best interests. As soon as the adolescent patient requests
care that carries with it serious medical risks, or is not
plainly in his/her best interests, the law must confront the
disjuncture between his/her varying levels of biological,
cognitive, and social maturity, and attempt to discern an
appropriate course of action. This cannot be accomplished
without the assistance of experts who understand the nature of adolescent development and who can conduct an
individualized assessment of the minor's capacity to understand the implications of the decision he/she wants to
make. Of course, those who are experts on adolescence are
few, and the standards by which they may ascertain competency are vague at best. Research into this population is
barely two decades old, and as yet no formula has
been
4
developed by which maturity might be measured.
Therefore, we may reject this approach because it is
costly, or because mistakes will inevitably be made in determining competency, or finally because the benefit of
permitting minors to refuse or accept relatively "high stakes"
medical treatment without parental consent is outweighed
by the risks of harm to both the minors and their families.
But if we truly advocate an approach premised on maturity, at present, when the treatment at issue is high risk,
and the utilitarian result is unclear, a case-by-case evaluation remains the only means to this end.

sta'ishment of goals for the future."' These skills are interrelated and cumulative, and they are acquired gradually
during adolescence.
Because many factors contribute to the capacity to
makc sound health care decisions, at no one age do adolescents suddenly become "mature" or competent. As noted
above, the early adolescent develops the "ability to reason
abstractly and to consider cause and effect relationships,...
[yet] has had little experience in applying these skills to
decisions in a more autonomous manner."-' As a result,
adolescents experience a chronic disjuncture caused by
varying levels of biological development, cognitive ability,
and experiential knowledge.
Rather than mistaking one of these markers, such as
cognitive ability, as indicative of adult-like capacity, the

2. Maturity in chronicallyand/orcriticallyill
adolescents
The result of the disjuncture among biological maturity,
cognitive ability, and experiential knowledge is that the
adolescent character is generally self-conscious and insecure, and demonstrates a heightened susceptibility to peerinfluenced, impulsive, risk-taking behavior s- The nascent
and relatively sparse medical literature on sick adolescents
demonstrates the ways in which these qualities generate
pernicious effects when coupled with chronic or critical
illness.
Research on the psychosocial experience of sick adolescents reveals exceptionally high rates of illness-related

defined and applied, the "maturity" standard poses two
major risks. First, maturity is so ill defined that its very
vagueness invites enormous discretion on the part of the
party charged with evaluating the minor's maturity. Hence,
as discussed, even if the law permits "mature" adolescents
to elect treatment without parental involvement, it is highly
likely that a health care provider or judge will simply substitute personal bias, finding the minor to be mature if the
adult approves of the minor's treatment choice, and immature if he/she disapproves.
A more important problem relates to our inability to
define maturity with any real precision because of our limited substantive understanding of the subject population.
If we expand the mature minor doctrine to permit minors
to make treatment choices that lack strong societal consensus, we are, by definition, limiting, if not abandoning,
the tacit utilitarian calculus that has driven minors' access
to care to date. Such a move can be tolerated only if those
regulating minors' decisional autonomy understand the
nature of adolescent capacity.
It is only in the past three decades that adolescence has
become an active and respected area of scientific inquiry.'
To develop a standard for evaluating the capacity of adolescents to make independent decisions regarding their
health care treatment, the law must be informed by substantial information regarding three subsets of adolescent
patients: (1) healthy adolescents who seek preventive and well-

ness care, (2) chronic and/or critically ill adolescents, and
(3) adolescents who seek to participate in medical research.

1.Maturity in healthy adolescents
Adolescence essentially is a transitional phase during which
a child grows into adulthood. A number of developmental
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emotional distress. Adolescents generally strive to be autonomous and to develop identities distinct from their
families.", These goals are necessarily more difficult to
achieve for the chronically and/or critically ill teen. At a
fundamental level, illness may impede an adolescent's
progress toward accomplishing the principle tasks of normal adolescent development, such as developing independence and a new relationship with one's family. Because
the sick adolescent may spend considerable time in hospital or simply isolated from peers, the developmental experience is interrupted and the adolescent may in fact regress
to an earlier developmental stageS?
Not surprisingly, chronically and/or critically ill teens
report suffering from depression, family system problems,
anxicti, and other major emotional disorders at rates far
exceeding not only their peers, but also those reported in
adults and children with similar illnesses. "x For example,
in one study of early adolescents being treated at a pediatric renal clinic, 49 percent were found to suffer from a
major emotional disorder related to their illness. "9
The negative psychological impact of illness on the
adolescent necessarily influences their decision-making
capacity. The law recognizes that depression and other
emotional disorders may render an otherwise competent
adult incapable of rational decision making. The same is
all the more true for the adolescent, whose baseline ability
to make such decisions is, in and of itself, questionable.
One example of this is seen in a study of adolescent girls
who refused to comply with chemotherapy regimens. When
interviewed, several of the critically ill patients reported
that they had ceased taking immunosuppressant steroid
medication because "their appearance was so repugnant to
them and caused such problems in their social relationships that, 'it was not worth it.'"6'
Because of these factors, the health care system should
be particularly concerned about noncompliance and refusal
of treatment by chronically or critically ill teens. Generally
speaking, the treatment of illnesses like cancer and diabetes demand a high degree of patient cooperation, which in
turn requires that patients understand the long-term significance of their illness as well as the likelihood that complications will result from a failure to comply with the
proposed course of treatment. Although patient compliance is notoriously poor across all ages," adolescent noncompliance in part reflects the inevitable and necessary
struggle toward adulthood. As a result, "[p]artly as a statement of independence, most adolescents refuse, at some
point, to comply with medical treatments, but they do so
without a good sense of the consequences of noncompli62
ance."
This analysis may cast a different light on some of the
cases discussed earlier. For example, Benny Agrelo's refusal to take his post-transplant medication may have reflected his striving for normalcy, coupled with a desperate

desire to feel healthier in the short-run, regardless of longterm consequences. Additionally, by abandoning the "sick
role," Benny was able to experience, however briefly, the
beginnings of independence from his family.
What insight we gain from the research on adolescent
patients, though, fails to resolve the legal dilemma raised
by adolescents' refusals of treatment. A host of reasons
may lead a teen to articulate a desire to reject treatment
that seems to be quite "mature": pain, fatigue, futility, social isolation and the failure to develop meaningful relationships, low self-esteem, frustration with dependency on
parents, or a distorted sense of future options. Many of
these justifications are integrally related to the developmental process of adolescence. In some cases, we may also
find them to be compelling. However, even in those cases
when adults might concur in the adolescent's decision to
refuse treatment, we generally do so not out of deference
to maturity, but out of compassion for human suffering.
Here, even more so than in the context of a healthy adolescent, an expert's independent evaluation of each patient's
capacity to make health care decisions seems imperative.
Yet, precisely because of the high stakes involved in these
cases, we must remain cognizant of the inherently elusive
nature of maturity, and we should be even more skeptical
of adolescents' requests to refuse life-sustaining treatment
than we are of treatment preferences that are less risky and
less permanent in nature.
3. Adolescents and medical research
The issues of competency and autonomy that complicate
the care of sick adolescents also emerge when one considers whether adolescents should be permitted to participate
in medical research. Medical research has traditionally been
viewed as nontherapeutic. Thus, when the federal government undertook the regulation of medical experimentation, it sought to protect minors and other vulnerable populations by erecting barriers to their participation in clinical
trialsP The result was that, even with parental support,
minors were limited in their ability to participate in clinical trials.6 Over the past decade, however, the restrictive
policies have been relaxed, largely in response to challenges
brought by excluded groups. These groups persuasively
argued that research trials often constitute the only "treatment" option for sick patients, and- that the exclusion of
entire subpopulations from research is unjust and produces
results that are scientifically compromised and incomplete.
As a result, the few clinical papers that analyze ethical and
legal issues in adolescents as research subjects all advocate
their inclusion."'
Analysis of the permissibility of adolescent participation in clinical research must take into account the various
circumstances in which such participation might occur.
First, some adolescents may wish to participate in medical
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research and have full parental support. Particularly if the
research protocol is therapeutic, this is a relatively easy
case. The minor is, in effect, seeking help for an acute or
chronic disease, and, provided that the parents and the
minor understand that the treatment still is under investigation, it is difficult to justify excluding the minor. We have
reason to be somewhat more hesitant when the research is
nontherapeutic. We may worry that the adolescent is being
exploited, or that the intangible benefits which come from
participation in nontherapeutic research can only be realized by an adult sensibility. These potential harms weigh
against an adolescents' participation in nontherapeutic research, particularly if it entails any risks to the adolescents'
well-being.
The far more complex issue, at least for our purposes,
is whether an adolescent should be permitted to participate in medical research without parental consent. At least
two commentators argue that the answer lies in the "mature minor doctrine," in that any minor sufficiently mature to "weigh risks and benefits" of other medical treatment can also do so in the research context." Although
they acknowledge the utilitarian, public health roots of the
minor treatment statutes, and note that adolescents demonstrate considerable variability in terms of understanding
the process of informed consent in research, the authors
nevertheless conclude that "[m]ature adolescents require
only the same procedural, well-defined safeguards as
adults." 17 Here we have yet another example of the unexamined expansion of this ambiguous doctrine.
The rising prevalence of HIV among minors well may
give rise to cases in which adolescents seek access to research without parental involvement (or in which the minors who seek access lack parents who might be involved).
I would argue that health care providers should only accede to these requests on a case-by-case basis, and only
when it is clear that the same circumstances that justify a
minor's access to other forms of hcalth care are present.
This requires either that the proposed research be in the
minor's best interests, or that an independent expert's evaluation demonstrate the minor's capacity to chose to participate.
Conclusion
Ideally, the struggle to understand and develop appropriate responses to adolescents in the health care setting would
be part of comprehensive social and legal undertaking. The
laws that govern minors are inconsistent and outmoded,
the institutions designed to protect the most vulnerable
minors are in shambles, and, increasingly, we are made
aware that adolescents are capable of massively destructive and self-destructive behavior. Because we are only a
few decades into our efforts to identify and describe the
phase of life we have come to call adolescence, it is not

surprising that the questions raised by this population are
more readily discerned than are the sophisticated answers
they require. However, we must guard against a tendency
to simplify the questions in an effort to wish away the very
fundamental challenges they pose to our medical, ethical,
and legal constructs. The trend toward an unexamined expansion of an ill-defined "mature minor" doctrine threatens to harm the very population it aims to empower.
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